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that the classical results of mathematical analy-
sis can be formally obtained in conservative
extensions of first-order arithmetic. For the
metamathematical work Gentzen’s introduction
of sequent calculi and the use of transfinite
induction along constructive ordinals turned out
to be very important, as well as Gödel’s primitive
recursive functionals of finite type. The methods
and results of proof theory are playing, not sur-
prisingly, a significant role in computer science.
Work in proof theory has been motivated by
issues in the foundations of mathematics, with
the explicit goal of achieving epistemological
reductions of strong theories for mathematical
practice (like set theory or second-order arith-
metic) to weak, philosophically distinguished
theories (like primitive recursive arithmetic). As
the formalization of mathematics in strong the-
ories is crucial for the metamathematical
approach, and as the programmatic goal can be
seen as a way of circumventing the philosophi-
cal issues surrounding strong theories, e.g., the
nature of infinite sets in the case of set theory,
Hilbert’s philosophical position is often equated
with formalism – in the sense of Frege in his Über
die Grundlagen der Geometrie (1903–06) and also
of Brouwer’s inaugural address Intuitionism and
Formalism (1912). Though such a view is not
completely unsupported by some of Hilbert’s
polemical remarks during the 1920s, on balance,
his philosophical views developed into a sophis-
ticated instrumentalism, if that label is taken 
in Ernest Nagel’s judicious sense (The Structure 
of Science, 1961). Hilbert’s is an instrumentalism
emphasizing the contentual motivation of math-
ematical theories; that is clearly expressed in the
first chapter of Hilbert and Bernays’s Grundlagen
der Mathematik I (1934). A sustained philosophi-
cal analysis of proof-theoretic research in the
context of broader issues in the philosophy of
mathematics was provided by Bernays; his pen-
etrating essays stretch over five decades and have
been collected in Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der
Mathematik (1976).
See also CONSISTENCY, FORMALIZATION,
GÖDEL’s INCOMPLETENESS THEOREMS, HIL-
BERT’s PROGRAM, METAMATHEMATICS. W.S.
propensity, an irregular or non-necessitating
causal disposition of an object or system to pro-
duce some result or effect. Propensities are usu-
ally conceived as essentially probabilistic in
nature. A die may be said to have a propensity of
“strength” or magnitude 1/6 to turn up a 3 if
thrown from a dice box, of strength 1/3 to turn up,
say, a 3 or 4, etc. But propensity talk is arguably
appropriate only when determinism fails.
Strength is often taken to vary from 0 to 1.
Popper regarded the propensity notion as a
new physical or metaphysical hypothesis, akin to
that of forces. Like Peirce, he deployed it to inter-
pret probability claims about single cases: e.g.,
the probability of this radium atom’s decaying in
1,600 years is 1/2. On relative frequency interpre-
tations, probability claims are about properties of
large classes such as relative frequencies of out-
comes in them, rather than about single cases.
But single-case claims appear to be common in
quantum theory. Popper advocated a propensity
interpretation of quantum theory. Propensities
also feature in theories of indeterministic or
probabilistic causation.
Competing theories about propensities at-
tribute them variously to complex systems such
as chance or experimental set-ups or arrange-
ments (a coin and tossing device), to entities
within such set-ups (the coin itself), and to par-
ticular trials of such set-ups. Long-run theories
construe propensities as dispositions to give rise
to certain relative frequencies of, or probability
distributions over, outcomes in long runs of tri-
als, which are sometimes said to “manifest” or
“display” the propensities. Here a propensity’s
strength is identical to some such frequency. By
contrast, single-case theories construe propensi-
ties as dispositions of singular trials to bring
about particular outcomes. Their existence, not
their strength, is displayed by such an outcome.
Here frequencies provide evidence about
propensity strength. But the two can always dif-
fer; they converge with a limiting probability of
1 in an appropriate long run.
See also CAUSATION, DETERMINISM, DISPO-
SITION, PEIRCE, PROBABILITY, QUANTUM
MECHANICS. D.S.
proper class. See CLASS.
properly basic relief. See EVIDENTIALISM, PLAN-
TINGA.
proper names, causal theory of. See CAUSAL THEORY
OF PROPER NAMES.
proper sensibles. See ARISTOTLE.
proper symbol. See SYNCATEGOREMATA.
properties of terms, doctrine of. See SHERWOOD.
property, roughly, an attribute, characteristic,
feature, trait, or aspect.
propensity property
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Intensionality. There are two salient ways of
talking about properties. First, as predicables or
instantiables. For example, the property red is
predicable of red objects; they are instances of it.
Properties are said to be intensional entities in the
sense that distinct properties can be truly predi-
cated of (i.e., have as instances) exactly the same
things: the property of being a creature with a
kidney & the property of being a creature with a
heart, though these two sets have the same
members. Properties thus differ from sets (col-
lections, classes); for the latter satisfy a principle
of extensionality: they are identical if they have
the same elements. The second salient way of
talking about properties is by means of property
abstracts such as ‘the property of being F’. Such
linguistic expressions are said to be intensional in
the following semantical (vs. ontological) sense:
‘the property of being F’ and ‘the property of
being G’ can denote different properties even
though the predicates ‘F’ and ‘G’ are true of
exactly the same things. The standard explana-
tion (Frege, Russell, Carnap, et al.) is that ‘the
property of being F’ denotes the property that
the predicate ‘F’ expresses. Since predicates ‘F’
and ‘G’ can be true of the same things without
being synonyms, the property abstracts ‘being F’
and ‘being G’ can denote different properties.
Identity criteria. Some philosophers believe
that properties are identical if they necessarily
have the same instances. Other philosophers
hold that this criterion of identity holds only for
a special subclass of properties – those that are
purely qualitative – and that the properties for
which this criterion does not hold are all “com-
plex” (e.g., relational, disjunctive, conditional, or
negative properties). On this theory, complex
properties are identical if they have the same
form and their purely qualitative constituents
are identical.
Ontological status. Because properties are a
kind of universal, each of the standard views on
the ontological status of universals has been
applied to properties as a special case. Nominal-
ism: only particulars (and perhaps collections of
particulars) exist; therefore, either properties do
not exist or they are reducible (following Carnap
et al.) to collections of particulars (including per-
haps particulars that are not actual but only pos-
sible). Conceptualism: properties exist but are
dependent on the mind. Realism: properties exist
independently of the mind. Realism has two
main versions. In rebus realism: a property exists
only if it has instances. Ante rem realism: a prop-
erty can exist even if it has no instances. For
example, the property of being a man weighing
over ton has no instances; however, it is plausi-
ble to hold that this property does exist. After all,
this property seems to be what is expressed by
the predicate ‘is a man weighing over a ton’.
Essence and accident. The properties that a
given entity has divide into two disjoint classes:
those that are essential to the entity and those
that are accidental to it. A property is essential
to an entity if, necessarily, the entity cannot exist
without being an instance of the property. A
property is accidental to an individual if it is pos-
sible for the individual to exist without being an
instance of the property. Being a number is an
essential property of nine; being the number of
the planets is an accidental property of nine.
Some philosophers believe that all properties are
either essential by nature or accidental by
nature. A property is essential by nature if it can
be an essential property of some entity and, nec-
essarily, it is an essential property of each entity
that is an instance of it. The property of being
self-identical is thus essential by nature. How-
ever, it is controversial whether every property
that is essential to something must be essential
by nature. The following is a candidate coun-
terexample. If this automobile backfires loudly
on a given occasion, loudness would seem to be
an essential property of the associated bang.
That particular bang could not exist without
being loud. If the automobile had backfired
softly, that particular bang would not have
existed; an altogether distinct bang – a soft
bang – would have existed. By contrast, if a man
is loud, loudness is only an accidental property
of him; he could exist without being loud.
Loudness thus appears to be a counterexample:
although it is an essential property of certain
particulars, it is not essential by nature. It might
be replied (echoing Aristotle) that a loud bang
and a loud man instantiate loudness in different
ways and, more generally, that properties can be
predicated (instantiated) in different ways. If so,
then one should be specific about which kind of
predication (instantiation) is intended in the
definition of ‘essential by nature’ and ‘acciden-
tal by nature’. When this is done, the coun-
terexamples might well disappear. If there are
indeed different ways of being predicated
(instantiated), most of the foregoing remarks
about intensionality, identity criteria, and the
ontological status of properties should be refined
accordingly.
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